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Appendix A: Markets ordinal profiles
Market I. Assortative.
Worker Preferences Firm Preferences
w1 : [f1]  f2  f3  f4  f5  f6  f7  f8 f1 : [w1] w2 w3 w4 w5 w6 w7 w8
w2 : f1  [f2]  f3  f4  f5  f6  f7  f8 f2 : w1  [w2] w3 w4 w5 w6 w7 w8
w3 : f1  f2  [f3]  f4  f5  f6  f7  f8 f3 : w1 w2  [w3] w4 w5 w6 w7 w8
w4 : f1  f2  f3  [f4]  f5  f6  f7  f8 f4 : w1 w2 w3  [w4] w5 w6 w7 w8
w5 : f1  f2  f3  f4  [f5]  f6  f7  f8 f5 : w1 w2 w3 w4  [w5] w6 w7 w8
w6 : f1  f2  f3  f4  f5  [f6]  f7  f8 f6 : w1 w2 w3 w4 w5  [w6] w7 w8
w7 : f1  f2  f3  f4  f5  f6  [f7]  f8 f7 : w1 w2 w3 w4 w5 w6  [w7] w8
w8 : f1  f2  f3  f4  f5  f6  f7  [f8] f8 : w1 w2 w3 w4 w5 w6 w7  [w8]
Note: This market was chosen as is.
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Market II. One; fully aligned.
Worker Preferences Firm Preferences
w1 : f1  f2  f3  f4  f5  f6  [f7]  f8 f1 : [w3] w8 w7 w4 w5 w6 w1 w2
w2 : f1  f2  f3  f4  f5  f6  f7  [f8] f2 : [w6] w4 w5 w3 w2 w7 w1 w8
w3 : [f1]  f2  f3  f4  f5  f6  f7  f8 f3 : [w8] w5 w3 w6 w1 w7 w2 w4
w4 : f1  f2  f3  f4  [f5]  f6  f7  f8 f4 : [w5] w3 w4 w1 w7 w8 w6 w2
w5 : f1  f2  f3  [f4]  f5  f6  f7  f8 f5 : [w4] w1 w2 w6 w7 w3 w8 w5
w6 : f1  [f2]  f3  f4  f5  f6  f7  f8 f6 : w4  [w7] w3 w8 w5 w2 w6 w1
w7 : f1  f2  f3  f4  f5  [f6]  f7  f8 f7 : w5  [w1] w3 w7 w4 w8 w6 w2
w8 : f1  f2  [f3]  f4  f5  f6  f7  f8 f8 : [w2] w1 w3 w7 w6 w5 w4 w8
Note: This market was constrained to have symmetric preferences on the worker side. Firm preferences were randomly
varied to generate a unique stable match.
Market III. Split; two aligned.
Worker Preferences Firm Preferences
w1 : f1  f2  f3  f4  f5  f6  f7  f8 f1 : w5  w1 w6 w2 w3 w7 w4 w8
w2 : f1  f2  f3  f4  f5  f6  f7  f8 f2 : w1  w4 w2 w3 w6 w8 w7 w5
w3 : f1  f2  f3  f4  f5  f6  f7  f8 f3 : w4 w1  w3 w2 w5 w6 w8 w7
w4 : f1  f2  f3  f4  f5  f6  f7  f8 f4 : w3 w1 w4  w2 w5 w8 w7 w6
w5 : f5  f6  f7  f8  f1  f2  f3  f4 f5 : w2 w1  w7 w5 w4 w8 w3 w6
w6 : f5  f6  f7  f8  f1  f2  f3  f4 f6 : w7  w6 w5 w8 w2 w4 w1 w3
w7 : f5  f6  f7  f8  f1  f2  f3  f4 f7 : w6  w8 w5 w7 w1 w4 w2 w3
w8 : f5  f6  f7  f8  f1  f2  f3  f4 f8 : w8 w7 w6  w5 w3 w2 w4 w1
Note: This market was found by constraining one side to have two blocks with symmetric preferences. Firm preferences
were randomly varied to generate the two distinct stable matches with moderate truncation required to get to an F-best stable
match. We additionally searched for two modifications that changed a single participant’s preferences by switching his/her
ranked order of two participants from the other side, which would remove one of the two stable matches.
Market IV. Two matches; one very unstable.
Worker Preferences Firm Preferences
w1 : f1  f7  f8  f2  f5  f4  f3  f6 f1 : w2 w6 w3  w4 w5 w7 w8  w1
w2 : f2  f8  f3  f4  f1  f6  f5  f7 f2 : w8 w4 w6 w3  w5 w7 w1  w2
w3 : f3  f4  f1  f5  f8  f2  f6  f7 f3 : w8 w5 w1 w6 w2 w4 w7  w3
w4 : f4  f1  f5  f8  f2  f3  f7  f6 f4 : w2 w1 w6  w3 w7 w8 w5  w4
w5 : f5  f2  f1  f7  f3  f8  f4  f6 f5 : w1 w3  w6 w7 w4 w2 w8  w5
w6 : f6  f5  f8  f2  f4  f7  f3  f1 f6 : w3 w1 w5  w7 w4 w8 w2  w6
w7 : f7  f6  f2  f5  f3  f1  f4  f8 f7 : w1 w4 w3 w8 w5 w2 w6  w7
w8 : f8  f3  f1  f2  f5  f6  f7  f4 f8 : w2 w6 w3 w1 w7 w5 w4  w8
Note: This market was found by constraining to two distinct stable matches with maximum truncation required to get to
the F-best stable match.
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Market V. Two matches; unaligned preferences.
Worker Preferences Firm Preferences
w1 : f6  f1  f8  f4  f3  f2  f5  f7 f1 : w3  w6  w1 w7 w5 w8 w2 w4
w2 : f3  f1  f2  f4  f5  f7  f8  f6 f2 : w3 w8 w1 w7  w2 w4 w6 w5
w3 : f3  f6  f8  f2  f1  f7  f5  f4 f3 : w1  w8  w3 w4 w2 w6 w5 w7
w4 : f3  f4  f7  f5  f1  f2  f6  f8 f4 : w2 w1  w4 w5 w7 w3 w8 w6
w5 : f6  f1  f5  f3  f2  f4  f8  f7 f5 : w2 w8 w3  w5 w1 w4  w6 w7
w6 : f6  f2  f4  f5  f1  f7  f8  f3 f6 : w2 w8  w7  w5 w4 w6 w3 w1
w7 : f8  f7  f1  f6  f2  f3  f5  f4 f7 : w1 w2 w8 w6 w5  w4 w3  w7
w8 : f8  f1  f4  f3  f2  f7  f5  f6 f8 : w1 w5  w8 w4 w3 w7 w6 w2
Note: This market was only constrained by a requirement to have two distinct stable matches. We additionally searched for
modifications that changed a single participant’s preferences by switching his/her ranked order of two participants from the
other side and removed one of the stable matches.
Market VI. Four-by-four market.
Worker Preferences Firm Preferences
w1 : f2  f4  f1  f3  f8  f7  f6  f5 f1 : w1  w2 w3 w4 w5 w6 w8 w7
w2 : f2  f1  f4  f3  f7  f6  f5  f8 f2 : w3  w1 w2 w4 w8 w5 w7 w6
w3 : f4  f2  f3  f1  f6  f5  f8  f7 f3 : w3  [w4] w1 w2 w6 w7 w5 w8
w4 : f1  [f3]  f4  f2  f5  f8  f7  f6 f4 : w2  w3 w4 w1 w7 w8 w6 w5
w5 : f6  f8  f5  f7  f4  f3  f2  f1 f5 : [w5]  w6 w7 w8 w1 w2 w4 w3
w6 : f6  f5  f8  f7  f3  f2  f1  f4 f6 : [w7]  w5 w6 w8 w4 w1 w3 w2
w7 : f8  f6  f7  f5  f2  f1  f4  f3 f7 : w7  [w8] w5 w6 w2 w3 w1 w4
w8 : f5  [f7]  f8  f6  f1  f4  f3  f2 f8 : [w6]  w7 w8 w5 w3 w4 w2 w1
Note: This market was designed to have two four-by-four submarkets. There are two stable (nondistinct) matches within
each submarket, for a total of four aggregate stable matches.
Appendix B: Theoretical background
B.1 The underlying model
Let W and F be disjoint, finite sets. We call the elements of W proposers and the ele-
ments of F receivers. The sets W and F can represent medical residents and hospitals,
men and women, parents and schools, etcetera, that are to be matched to one another
in the market.1 A matching is a function μ :W ∪ F →W ∪ F such that for all w ∈W and
f ∈ F ,
(i) μ(f ) ∈W ∪ {f },
(ii) μ(w) ∈ F ∪ {w},
(iii) w = μ(f ) if and only if f = μ(w),
where the notation μ(a) = a means that participant a is unmatched under μ, and
f = μ(w) denotes that w and f are matched under μ. We denote the set of all possible
matchings, given the sets W and F , as M.
1Since in many centralized labor market applications, it is the workers (say, the doctors in the NRMP)
who serve as proposers and the firms (the hospitals in the NRMP) who serve as receivers, we use the corre-
sponding acronyms W and F to denote the two sets.
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A preference relation is a linear, transitive, and antisymmetric binary relation (all
preferences are strict; no proposer or receiver is indifferent over two distinct partners).
A preference relation for a proposer w ∈ W , denoted Pw, is understood to be over the
set F ∪ {w}. Similarly, for a receiver f ∈ F , Pf denotes a preference relation over W ∪ {f }.
If any participant a prefers remaining unmatched to being matched with another par-
ticipant a′ (a Pa a′), we will say that the match μ(a) = a′ is not individually rational, or
unacceptable, for a. We assume that each proposer (receiver) prefers every receiver (pro-
poser) to remaining unmatched.2
A preference profile is a list P of preference relations for proposers and receivers:
P = ((Pw)w∈W  (Pf )f∈F )
As is standard, for i ∈ W ∪ F , we denote by P−i the profile of preferences for all agents
but i. Let P be the set of all possible preference profiles, and for an agent i ∈ W ∪ F , let
Pi denote the set of possible preferences for i.
We assume that preferences are strict. Denote by Rw the weak version of Pw. So
f ′ Rw f if f ′ = f or f ′ Pw f . The definition of Rf is analogous.
Fix a preference profile P . We say that a pair (w f ) blocks the matching μ if f Pwμ(w)
and w Pf μ(f ). A matching is stable if it is individually rational and there is no pair that
blocks it.3 Finally, denote by S(P) the set of all stable matchings.
B.2 Centralized mechanisms
A mechanism is a function φ : P →M that assigns a matching to each preference profile.
A mechanism is stable if φ(P) ∈ S(P) for all P ∈ P .
Gale and Shapley (1962) proved that every preference profile admits a stable match-
ing, and provided the following algorithm to identify one.
Algorithm 1 (Deferred Acceptance).
• Step 0. The set A0 of active proposers consists of all the proposers. All receivers
have no tentative partners.
• For k= 12    , repeat the following step until Ak is empty:
• Step k.
– Each proposer w in Ak−1 proposes to the highest ranked receiver according to Pw,
across all of the receivers w has not proposed to in previous steps of the algorithm.
– Each receiver f chooses the best partner (according to Pf ), out of the set of pro-
posers that proposed to f in Step k, and f ’s tentative match from Step k− 1. This choice
is f ’s new tentative match; reject all other proposals.
2This fits our experimental design where remaining unmatched is the worst outcome.
3Since we assume that partners are always acceptable, any matching is individually rational under the
true preferences.
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– The set Ak is formed from the set of all active proposers rejected in this step: either
their proposal to a receiver was rejected or they were tentatively matched in Step k− 1,
and rejected in favor of a new proposal.
• Stop
The tentative matching at the end of the last step is the output matching.
Theorem 1 (Gale–Shapley Theorem). The set S(P) is nonempty, and there are two
matchings μW and μF in S(P) such that, for all w, f , and μ ∈ S(P),
μW (w) Rw μ(w) Rw μF(w)
μF(f ) Rf μ(f ) Rf μW (f )
The matching μW is called proposer best while μF is called receiver best. Beyond its
theoretical role in establishing existence, the DA algorithm is often used in centralized
markets. For instance, the National Resident Matching Program uses a close modifica-
tion of the DA algorithm (where physicians serve as proposers and hospitals serve as
receivers).
A mechanism φ defines a direct revelation game—the normal-form game where the
agents in W ∪F simultaneously report their preferences—so the strategy space of agent
i is Pi and the outcome of a profile P is given by φ(P). Denote by φDA the mechanism
defined by the DA procedure.
For an agent i ∈ W ∪ F , truth-telling is a weakly dominant strategy if, for any pref-
erence profile P ′i different from the true preferences Pi, and any profile P˜−i of all agents
but i, α2P ,
φ(Pi P˜−i)(i) Ri φ
(
P ′i P˜−i
)
(i)
A mechanism is strategy proof if truth-telling is weakly dominant for all agents. As it
turns out, we have the following mechanism (see Roth and Sotomayor (1990)).
Theorem 2 (Strategy Proofness in Stable Mechanisms). In φDA, truth-telling is weakly
dominant for proposers. No stable mechanism is strategy proof.
Fix a preference profile P , and suppose that all proposers w truthfully choose Pw
as their strategy in the direct-revelation game. We consider the induced game among
receivers, where receivers simultaneously choose a preference profile P˜f ∈ Pf . A Nash
equilibrium of the induced game is a profile of preferences (P ′f )f∈F such that
φ
(
(Pw)w∈W 
(
P ′f ′
)
f ′∈F
)
(f ) Rf φ
(
(Pw)w∈W  P˜f 
(
P ′f ′
)
f ′∈F\f
)
(f )
for all f ∈ F and P˜f ∈ Pf .
The following result is well known (again, see Roth and Sotomayor (1990)).
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Theorem 3 (Equilibrium Outcomes in Stable Mechanisms). Consider any stable mech-
anism implementing the proposer-optimal stable matching for any reported preferences.
In the game induced from truth-telling by the proposers, the set of Nash equilibrium out-
comes coincides with the set of stable matchings.
B.3 Outcome equivalence
We present the main intuition behind the equivalence between our game and the DA
direct-revelation game. Our game is dynamic, and agents can condition their actions
on the outcomes of past decisions. The DA direct-revelation game is static. We impose
restrictions on agents’ strategies that make the differences between the two games irrel-
evant. Essentially, our assumptions say that we can think of agents’ strategies as being
preference relations.
Heuristically, a strategy for a proposer maps any sequence of past proposals (with
their corresponding outcomes) into a current proposal. We first restrict strategies to only
depend on available proposals. For example, if w1 can only propose to f1 or f2, his choice
should be independent of the precise sequence of (rejected) proposals that ended with
f1 and f2 as the remaining choices. While this restriction seems realistic, it is easy to
write down examples that violate it. For example, w1 may choose f1 over f2 when, in a
past turn, he proposed to f3 and was immediately rejected. But he may choose f2 instead
if his proposal to f3 was initially accepted, and rejected several turns later.
The second restriction is standard in choice theory. A strategy for a proposer is a
mapping from sets of available receivers into a proposal; for each set F ′ of receivers,
either some f ∈ F ′ is proposed to or no proposal is made. The strategy is then a choice
function that can take empty-set values. Under standard conditions from choice theory
(such as the congruence axiom of Richter (1966)), we can represent such a strategy with
a preference relation.4
We make analogous assumptions on receivers’ behavior. A receiver’s strategy is a de-
cision on which proposal to accept, given any set of proposals made by the active pro-
posers, and any proposer whose proposal the receiver holds. Again, the restrictions we
impose are of two types. First, strategies cannot depend on histories per se. Second,
strategies obey certain minimal consistency requirements across time, so that they can
be represented as preference relations.
We show that a profile of strategies, once represented as a profile of preference re-
lations, generates the same outcome as the profile that would have been generated in
the preference-revelation game φDA. Hence, the incentives faced by proposers and re-
ceivers in both games are the same.
4Namely, we can find a preference ranking Pw such that for any set of available receivers F ′, if there is
some acceptable receiver under Pw , the one that is the most preferred according to Pw in F ′ is proposed
to. The restrictions are reminiscent of the weak axiom of revealed choice, assuring consistency of observed
behavior.
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B.4 Static and dynamic deferred-acceptance mechanisms
The following example, which appeared in Niederle and Yariv (2011), illustrates how
weakly dominated strategies on the parts of proposers alone do not lead to the same
predictions in the static and dynamic versions of the deferred acceptance mechanism.
Example (Additional Equilibrium Outcomes in the Dynamic Version of Deferred Ac-
ceptance). Consider a market consisting of proposers {W 1W 2W 3} and receivers
{F1F2F3}, where all agents prefer to be matched rather than unmatched. Let the in-
duced ordinal preferences  of the three proposers and colors be given by
W1 : F2 F1 F3
W2 : F1 F2 F3
W3 : F1 F2 F3
F1 : W1W 3W 2
F2 : W2W 1W 3
F3 : W 1W3W 2.
The unique stable matching μ is given below (where we use the convention that each
column in the matrix denotes a match between the specified proposer and color),
μ(W i) = Fi for all i. In particular, the DA mechanism entails a unique equilibrium in
weakly undominated strategies yielding μ. Nonetheless, the matching μ˜ (in which W 1
and W 2 swap colors relative to μ) can be induced in our dynamic mechanism:
μ=
(
W 1 W 2 W 3
F1 F2 F3
)
 μ˜=
(
W 1 W 2 W 3
F2 F1 F3
)

Indeed, the following profile in weakly undominated strategies constitutes part of an
equilibrium:
Period 1: Proposer W 3 makes an offer to F3 who accepts.
Period 2: Proposer W 1 makes an offer to F2 and W 2 makes an offer to F1 who accept.
Upon any deviation, offers from agents other than the stable match or the most-
preferred match are rejected and all revert to emulating the deferred acceptance strate-
gies (in particular, F1 rejects an offer from W 3).
Notice that time plays an important role in the construction of this equilibrium. In-
deed, as highlighted in Niederle and Yariv (2011), the crucial element driving this con-
struction is the ability of some participants to commit and of others to condition their
behavior on observed market outcomes (note that once W 3 is accepted, he cannot es-
cape F3).5
B.5 Outcome and strategic equivalence
In the dynamic setup, at each period t agents monitor only partial activity in the market.
We now describe the information each agent has throughout the game. At the beginning
5Interestingly, this equilibrium is not robust in that it is not sequential (for instance, F1 would need to
believe that other agents will deviate as well when observing an offer from W 3, but the market does not
offer enough monitoring for that).
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of period t, each proposer w observes a history that consists of the (timed) offers the
proposer made and the responses of receivers to those offers, denoted by r for rejection
and h for holding (where we use the notational convention that an offer to no receiver is
denoted as an offer to ∅ that is immediately rejected):
hWtw ∈
(
(F ∪ ∅)× {rh})t−1
The set of all possible histories at time t for proposer w is denoted by HWtw.
In addition, at each period t, suppose receivers f1     fk(t−1) rejected offers from
proposer w in periods 1     t − 1. Denote by F˜ tw = {f |f /∈ {f1     fk(t−1)}} the set of re-
ceivers who have not rejected proposer w yet.
Each receiver acts in the second stage of each period t and observes a history that
consists of all (timed) offers she received and a (timed) sequence of offers she held:6
hFtf ∈
(
2W
)t × (2W )t 
The set of all possible histories at time t for receiver f is denoted by HFtf .
In addition, at each period t, suppose proposers w1    wk(t−1) made offers to re-
ceiver f in periods 1     t. Denote by W˜ tf = {w|w /∈ {w1    wk(t−1)}} the set of proposers
who have not made an offer to receiver f .
A strategy for proposerw is a collection of mappings {σWtw}, whereσWtw :HWtw → F∪∅,
and whenever at time t, σWtw(h
W
tw) = ∅, then σWtw(hWtw) ∈ F˜ tw. A strategy for receiver f is
a collection of mappings {σFtf }, where σFtf : HFtf → (W ∪ ∅)2
W ×(W ∪∅). That is, after each
history, the receiver’s strategy specifies which proposer (if any) would be held from a
menu of proposer offers (when possibly already holding an offer).
Note that for proposers, we could, in fact, describe the strategy as σWtw : HWtw →
{P(w)} (when defining a receiver approached at later periods as less preferred).
If agents condition their behavior on time per se, the dynamic setup may, in princi-
ple, lead to very different outcomes than the static one. We make the following assump-
tions.
Assumption 1 (Stationarity). Strategies do not depend on sequencing: For any proposer
w, there exists τWw : 2F → F ∪ ∅, such that whenever at time t proposer w is not held and
under history hWtw, F˜
t
w are the receivers he can make an offer to, σ
W
tw(h
W
tw)= τWw (F˜tw).
For any receiver f , there exists τFf : 2W × (W ∪∅)→W ∪∅, such that whenever at time t
receiver f has observed history hFtf , under which she holds an offer from f ∈ F ∪ ∅ (where
holding an offer from ∅ is interpreted as not holding an offer), and the set of proposers
who made her an offer in t is W˜ , then σFtf (h
F
tf )= τFf (W˜ w).
Assume that proposers make offers whenever they can.
Stationarity in and of itself does not assure a representation through a preference
ranking. Indeed, if τWw (f1 f2) = f1, but τWw (f1 f2 f3) = f2, this would not be consistent
6An offer of proposer w to receiver f that is held from period t to t ′ is recorded as an offer made in periods
t t+1     t ′ that is held by the receiver in each of these periods. We use a similar convention for proposers.
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with a preference ordering. Namely, a form of independence of irrelevant alternatives
is being violated. Furthermore, if τWw (f1 f2) = f1, τWw (f2 f3) = f2, and τWw (f3 f1) = f3,
we would obtain a violation of transitivity when trying to explain behavior through a
preference ordering. This is in the spirit of violations of the weak axiom of revealed pref-
erences.
The equivalence between the two types of mechanisms rests on a familiar idea from
choice theory, effectively a variation of independence of irrelevant alternatives.
Let X be a finite set and let B⊆ 2X . A choice function is a function C : B→ X such
that C(A) ∈A for all A ∈ B. We can associate a binary relation C with C, where xC y if
and only if there is a set A ∈ B with xy ∈A and x= C(A). Note that C is the revealed-
preference relation.
The choice function C satisfies the congruence axiom if C is acyclic; that is, if when-
ever x1     xK is a sequence in X such that
x1 C x2 C · · · C xK
then it is false that xK C x1.
In our setup, each proposer w and receiver f is characterized by a choice function,
τWw and τ
F
f , respectively. We say that the congruence axiom holds when all agents’ choice
functions satisfy the congruence axiom.
Proposition 1 (Equivalence). Whenever stationarity and the congruence axiom hold,
equilibria outcomes in weakly undominated strategies of the static DA mechanism co-
incide with equilibria outcomes in weakly undominated strategies of the dynamic DA
mechanism. Furthermore, there is a one-to-one mapping between weakly undominated
equilibrium strategy profiles corresponding to the two mechanisms.
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